Coalition Formation in Agricultural Supply Chains: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach

V. Deibe Blanco, M. J. Campuzano, R. ACOSTA

This work presents a model of cooperation in agricultural supply chains, inspired by the formation of coalitions between actors such as producers, distributors, retailers and governments. In this case, the benefits generated by cooperation must be allocated among a set of actors involved at different levels of the supply chain. In contrast to other approaches in the literature, which tend to focus on the individual optimisation of each actor or on the coordination of only one level of the chain (e.g. only between producers or only between distributors), this model considers the interdependence between the different levels and allows for the formation of strategic coalitions along the entire chain. In this context, allocation methods based on concepts from cooperative game theory, including Shapley Value, the Nucleus and the Nucleolus, are analysed with the aim of ensuring fair and stable allocations.

Keywords: Cooperative Game Theory, Shapley Value, fair allocations, agricultural supply chains

Game Theory
June 12, 2025  7:00 PM
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