A. Bernárdez Ferradás, M. Á. Mirás Calvo, C. Quinteiro Sandomingo, E. Sánchez Rodríguez
In an airport problem, a group of agents are clones of each other if they have the same cost parameter. We present a thorough description of the structure of the set of contribution vectors for a problem that satisfy the no-subsidy constraints. We provide simplified formulae to compute the basic rules in terms of the different cost parameters and the number of cloned agents in each group. For some rules that formulation is given by a weighted version of the rule. The structure of the set of contribution vectors is used to revisit priority rules. Remarkably, the allocation chosen by the core-center rule can be computed in the reduced dimensional space given by the different cost parameters. Finally, we analyze whether a rule satisfies replication invariance or if it converges under replication to another rule.
Keywords: Airport problems, weighted rules, core-center rule, Dirichlet distribution, replication invariance
Scheduled
Game Theory
June 12, 2025 7:00 PM
Mr 2