M. Álvarez Mozos, J. M. Alonso Meijide, M. G. Fiestras Janeiro, A. Jiménez Losada
We introduce a new value for global cooperative games that we call the Partition lattice value. A global game describes the overall utility that agents generate depending on how they are organized in coalitions without specifying what part of that utility is each coalition responsible for. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to this family of games that may imply a big loss of information. Here we take an alternative approach motivated by how the Shapley value distributes payoffs in unanimity games. The Partition lattice value is characterized by five properties. Three of them are also used in the characterization of the Gilboa-Lehrer value and another is weaker that the fourth and last property of their characterization. The last property of our result is new and describes how are payoffs distributed among the coalitions in global unanimity games.
Keywords: Global games, Shapley value, Contribution, Partition lattice
Scheduled
Teoría de juegos. Fundamentos I
June 12, 2025 5:10 PM
Mr 2