A. Valencia-Toledo, J. Vidal-Puga

In cooperative game theory it is known that two-person bargaining problems have no relevant ordinal solution. For three players, Shapley and Shubik propose an ordinal solution. However, this solution does not take into account the worth of proper subcoalitions of size 2. In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing a generalization of the Shapley-Shubik rule for Non transferable utility games. The resulting solutions, when applied to transferable utility games, always belong to the core, which makes it a relevant alternative to other core-selectors such as the nucleolus. We also apply the new solution to a practical case related to mining and natural resources management.

Keywords: NTU-games, Ordinal Shapley–Shubik value, mining, natural resources management

Scheduled

Teoría de juegos. Fundamentos I
June 12, 2025  5:10 PM
Mr 2


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LATENCIA EN MULTICOMUNICACIÓN. UNA PERSPECTIVA JUEGO TEÓRICA

C. M. Manuel García, E. C. Gavilán García, D. Martín García, S. López, M. Saboya

The Partition Lattice Value for Global Cooperative Games

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Valor posicional y reglas fracción constante en problemas de costes en árboles con nodo raíz

E. C. Gavilán García, C. M. Manuel García, R. van den Brink, T. Oishi


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