F. Temprano Garcia, L. Mallozzi, J. Puerto
Security games is a classic problem in Game theory, where two different player roles can be distinguished, attackers and defenders. Indeed, the classic Security Games was presented as a two-player game between a defender and an attacker. Each of the players will make a decision based on its role and its profit/pay-off function in the Security game.
Specifically, we have analyzed them as Stackelberg games where the defenders play the leader role and attackers the follower role. The case where there is just one defender and a set of possible attackers to face has been deeply studied and analyzed.
In this talk, we have considered two variants of the above problem. The first one consists of multiple defenders that can cooperate to increase their benefits, and the second one contemplates the possibility of limiting the attacker decision space as a decision of the defenders. The solution structures of these new problems are analyzed and compared with the ones of the original problems.
Keywords: Bilevel optimization, Game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium
Scheduled
Location(GELOCA1)
June 11, 2025 3:30 PM
Mr 2