C. Cordoba-Rovira, A. Meca Martínez, L. Guardiola
The measurement of individual productivity and, consequently, the distribution of overall productivity within a network of workers exhibiting peer effects has been a topic of ongo- ing interest across various fields, from academia to industry. In this paper, we propose an extension of the work by Allouch et al. (2024), based on cooperative game theory, which considers peer effects on productivity, represented through a complete network model. To achieve this, we construct a series of cooperative games where the characteristic function for each coalition of workers is equal to the sum of the intrinsic productivity of each worker, along with the productivity of other workers within a specified distance, adjusted by an attenuation factor. This approach enables us to evaluate a characteristic function that quantifies the value of coalitions, providing a method to calculate aggregated productivity for specific sets of workers.
Palabras clave: Productivity, peer effects, complete networks, cooperative games
Programado
Game practice and OR Games II
13 de junio de 2025 09:00
MR 2