Cost allocation revisited in airport games from a contemporanean approach: code-sharing effects

A. Saavedra Nieves, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

An important operational aspect in airport management is the allocation of fees to aircraft movements on a runway, whether operated by separate operators or under code-sharing agreements. In this talk we analyse the problem of determining fees under code-sharing of the movements at an airport from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we propose the configuration value for games with coalition configuration as the mechanism for allocating operating costs. We provide the exact expression of this game-theoretic solution for airport games, which depends only on the parameters of the associated airport problem. For this purpose, we consider a new and natural game-theoretic characterization of the configuration value. Finally, for the specific context of airport games, we apply it to a real case as a mechanism to determine the aircraft fees at a Spanish airport in a code-sharing scenario.

Palabras clave: Aircraft fees, code-sharing, coalition configuration, configuration value, axioms

Game practice and OR Games II
13 de junio de 2025  09:00
MR 2

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