I. Núñez Lugilde, I. M. García Jurado
In multiwinner elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of candidates, known as a committee, based on voters' approval preferences. This paper examines multiwinner elections with a priori unions, where candidates form strategic alliances before the voting process. We extend existing approval-based multiwinner election rules, including Approval-Based Committee (ABC) scoring rules and Phragmén's methods, to incorporate these unions. Additionally, we introduce a new family of multiwinner election rules based on concepts from cooperative game theory, establishing a link between elections rules and power distribution measures such as the Shapley value. We further provide an axiomatic characterization of these rules and illustrate their practical implications through an application to the Spanish Senate elections, highlighting the impact of a priori unions in multiwinner elections.
Palabras clave: Multiwinner elections, election rules, a priori unions, cooperative game theory, Shapley value, Spanish Senate elections.
Programado
Jovenes Investigadores en teoría de juegos
12 de junio de 2025 11:30
MR 2