J. M. Camacho Rodríguez, R. Naveiro, D. Rios Insua
Security games provide a robust and flexible framework for modeling strategic and operational challenges in defense and homeland security (DHS). However, these games are often studied using game-theoretic approaches that rely on the assumption of common knowledge—an assumption that rarely holds in DHS contexts. Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) offers a Bayesian alternative that addresses these limitations.
In this talk, we introduce a computational methodology for analyzing general security games from an ARA perspective. Our approach is capable of resolving any game represented as a bi-agent Influence Diagram, accommodating both discrete and continuous decision domains and supporting an arbitrary number of decisions per agent. We also discuss the computational challenges posed by continuous decision spaces and multi-stage decision processes. To illustrate the practical applicability of our methodology, we present a case study on disinformation warfare.
Palabras clave: Adversarial risk analysis, Augmented probability simulation, Security games, Disinformation
Programado
Interdisciplinary applications of Bayesian methods
10 de junio de 2025 15:30
Sala de prensa (MR 13)